We introduce new hash functions SSInhash, n ¼ 160, 192, 256, 384, 512, 1024 and 2048, whose algorithm is, differently from many other hash functions, consisting of multiplication and shift of multiple-precision integers. The base of algorithm is a repetition of piecewise linear chaos mappings called SSR computations. We first construct a tiny hash function SSRhash which is derived from SSR algorithm directly, and then translate it into allinteger version SSInhash whose hash value is n bits. After constructing hash functions we verify randomness of hash values generated by SSInhash by applying the NIST statistical test suite and TestU01. We further discuss the security of our hash function by deriving algebraic equation of high degree.
Introduction
We can consider that a hash function is a mathematical function whose input is a stream of bytes of arbitrary length and output after computing is a random number of fixed length. An essential property required for hash function first is that hash values generated by that hash function must be good uniform random numbers. If a hash function is used as a secure hash function, then it is further required that the function is safe to attack.
The purpose of this paper is to show that (1) we can construct hash functions, differently from many other hash functions, by multiplication and shift of multiple-precision integers, (2) hash functions constructed above have sufficiently good statistical properties, (3) the algorithm of our hash function is flexible and can treat any size of hash values, and (4) our hash functions have sufficient security as secure hash functions. Recently a new nonrecursive pseudorandom number generator called SSI32 was introduced [7, 9] . In [7] they observed cancellation errors of numerical computations of sin x and showed that random numbers could be extracted from them. Then they successfully caused artificial cancellation errors by shift of mantissa of IEEE 754 floating point formats, and constructed a new random number generator SSR (the Simplified Shift-Real RNG). The arithmetic instructions used there were multiplication and shift of double precision floating point variables. The SSI32 RNG is an integral (= allinteger) version of SSR. The algorithm of SSR is based on iteration of so-called chaos mapping in one dimensional dynamical system [2, 5] . Because the SSR algorithm is very simple and flexible, we can easily embed given binary data in a process of generating SSR random number. This means that we can construct hash functions based on SSR algorithm. In this paper we propose new hash functions SSR32hash and its integral version SSInhash (n ¼ 160; 192; 256; 384; 512; 1024; 2048). The theoretical background of these hash functions is rather analytic(ergodic) and is quite different from other well-known hash functions [6] .
Since the SSR algorithm is not so known, we first review the argument given in [7] in the next section. In §3 we introduce the SSR32hash which is a simple and tiny hash function derived from SSR algorithm. The SSR32hash is the base of SSInhash, and sometimes called SSRhash. In §4 we explain our main hash function SSInhash. SSInhash is sometimes called SSIhash. The algorithm of SSInhash is almost the same as SSRhash. To illustrate how SSIhash are constructed we mainly treat the case n ¼ 1024 and for the other n we only give the parameters for implementation. In §5 we examine statistical properties of SSIhash, that is, we regard hash functions SSRhash and SSIhash as pseudorandom number generators having long digits, and examine randomness of their hash values by applying the NIST statistical test suite [10] and TestU01 [3] . It will be shown that SSIhash has sufficiently good randomness as a hash function. In the last §6 we argue the security of our hash function SSR32hash as a secure hash function. The argument is proceeded based on the algebraic equation of high degree which is derived from the SSRhash algorithm.
The SSR Algorithm
The SSR RNG is a nonrecursive pseudorandom number generator which is the base of our hash functions. Since the algorithm of SSR is not so known and seems to be strange and curious at first look, we summarize below the argument given in [7] . For details we recommend to refer to [7, 8] . Now let us begin.
If we compute
. . . ; 19999, we have the following strange graph (Fig. 1) .
Analogously let u i be the 4-digits number obtained from sin x i , x i ¼ 22 þ 4 19999 Â i, i ¼ 0; 1; . . . ; 19999, by dropping the first 3 digits and taking out the succeeding 4 digits such as À6:66860437393188Eþ000 ! 8604. Then if we plot the pair of numbers 0:u 2j and 0:u 2jþ1 , j ¼ 0; 1; . . . ; 9999 on a plane, we have Fig. 2 . These graphs suggest us that u i 's are random numbers. The reason of the randomness of Horner's method is a drop of significant digits which is caused by a cancellation error such as
for k ¼ 25, 26, 27 and the nearby. (A cancellation error is caused by a subtraction of two numbers which are quite close each other.) In a floating point system a drop of leading zeros of mantissa yields a shift of mantissa to the left such as
This implies that if we can cause a cancellation error artificially by a shift of mantissa, then we would have a new algorithm of generating random numbers. One way of causing an artificial cancellation error is the following:
[The SSR computation È x ðtÞ] Let t and x be double precision floating point variables whose values are in ½1; 2Þ. Then, (i) compute t Â x as a usual floating point multiplication, (ii) if t Â x is in ½2; 4Þ, divide t Â x by 2 (! the mantissa of t Â x does not change, but t Â x is in ½1; 2Þ again), and (iii) shift all the bits of mantissa of t Â x to the left by one (hence an artificial cancellation error of one bit is caused by a drop of the most significant bit of mantissa).
Notice that the process (ii) above is imposed to make the map È x to be a transformation on ½1; 2Þ, that is, to ensure iteration of È x . The map È x : ½1; 2Þ ! ½1; 2Þ is a piecewise linear function represented by 
It is seen that È x is a chaos mapping in the sense (i) the value of È n x ðtÞ is extremely sensitive to the initial value t, (ii) È x has dense periodic points, and (iii) È x is transitive, that is, the orbit of some point of an invariant set of È x is dense [2, 5] . The chaotic property of È x essentially relies upon the expansive property of È x , namely d dt È x ðtÞ is equal to x or 2x and is greater than one.
By 
explicitly. The graph of HðtÞ, which is obtained from numerical computations of h x ðtÞ, x 2 ½1; 2Þ, is given in Fig. 3 .
Since the value È 
.) We will call this improvement the K-improvement of SSR.
The size of digit of SSR RNs is only 4. So we extend the SSR computation to SSRex computation in order to generate an 8-digits RN at a time.
[The SSRex computationÈ È x and SSRex random number] The SSRex computationÈ È x is the one which is obtained from SSR computation È x by changing the size of shift of mantissa to two. An SSRex RN is a succeeding 8 digits obtained fromÈ È 
Hash Function SSR32hash
In this section we introduce a simple and tiny hash function called SSR32hash which is derived from the SSR algorithm directly. The SSR32hash is a proto-type of SSInhash, and we are mainly interested in the statistical properties of randomness of hash values generated by SSR32hash.
The SSR32hash consists of two processes, namely ''compression'' and ''scrambling'', as other hash functions.
[ caused by ðB k È ÃÞ Â X is advanced to the left). and write the result byW W N . Although we intended to embed B k and N distantly from the LSB (least significant bit, b 52 ) of mantissa, the final valuẽ W W N might be quite similar if only the N-th value B N of B 1 Á Á Á B N has a slight difference. So we apply the following scrambling.
[Scrambling of compressed value] (SSR32hash) The algorithm is the same as SSRex RNG defined at the end of §2. Let Y be a double precision floating point variable.
As a hash value, take out bits b 13 Á Á Á b 44 of mantissa of (ix). (For speed-up sake we do not employ here the K-improvement.) The reason why we used the number 26 in (ix) above is that 2 (= the size of shift of mantissa) Â 26 is equal to the size of mantissa of double precision variable (¼ 52), which would be sufficient to sweep out the (direct) influence of the initial valueW
Randomness of hash values generated by SSR32hash will be tested in §5. (In general, a floating point system depends on a computer system, especially on MPU. Hence hash values generated by SSR32hash may occasionally be slightly different. However the difference of results of statistical test is very small and can be ignored.)
Hash Function SSInhash
In this section we construct integral (= all-integer) version of SSR32hash called SSInhash whose hash values is n bits (n ¼ 160; 192; 256; 384; 512; 1024; 2048). The algorithm of SSInhash is almost the same as SSR32hash, but does not depend on MPUs. Below we mainly treat the case n ¼ 1024, and for the other n we give values of parameters in a table.
Let B 1 B 2 Á Á Á B N be an input stream of bytes. Let F and X be multiple-precision integer-variables whose size are 1024 (¼ n) and 160 bits respectively. By using byte-variables F i and X j , F and X are represented such as F ¼ F 1 F 2 Á Á Á F 128 and X ¼ X 1 Á Á Á X 20 . The MSB of F and X are MSB of F 1 and X 1 , and the LSB of F and X are LSB of F 128 and X 20 respectively. The MSB of F and X correspond to the hidden bit of IEEE 754 floating point variables, and so they should be kept to be 1 at any time. (Note. When a real number x is represented in binary notation such as x ¼ a 1 a 2 Á Á Á a p :a pþ1 Á Á Á or 0:0 Á Á Á 0a 1 a 2 Á Á Á, the first bit a 1 is always 1. Therefore when x is stored in a floating point variable, the bit a 1 is not stored in the mantissa of the variable. The bit a 1 which is not stored is called the hidden bit.) Further we always set the LSB of F and X to be 1 in order to hold wide the places where effective bits (= bits with value 1) might spread after the multiplication F Â X (See the end of §6.1).
[Compression of input stream of bytes] (SSI1024hash) Let initial values of F and X be F 0 and X 0 respectively. Of course MSB and LSB of F 0 and X 0 are 1. Set the numbers L, M, E, P and D such that
Then we compute the value of F, say F ¼ F 1 ; F 2 ; . . . ; F bðNÀ1Þ=Ecþ1 as follows (bac is the largest integer not exceeding a):
(i) Suppose that F is determined up to F kÀ1 , and B 1 ; . . . ; B ðkÀ1ÞE have been already used.
:
Here È is XOR. If [Scrambling of compressed valueF F] (SSI1024hash)
and set the MSB and LSB of Y to be 1.
Construction, Randomness and Security of New Hash Functions Derived from Chaos Mappings
As a hash value, take out the succeeding L bytes (¼ n bits) after discarding the first Q=2 bytes of (ix). In Table 1 we give values of parameters for the other SSInhash.
Remarks
Randomness of SSR32hash and SSInhash
In this section we examine randomness of hash values generated by SSRhash and SSIhash. Tests we used were the NIST statistical test suite sts-2.0b [10] and TestU01 1.2.1 [3] . As input streams fB i g i¼0;1;... of bytes, we adopted integers of 8 bytes B ¼ B 1 B 2 Á Á Á B 8 starting from 0 with increment one. Hence the first and the second B, namely B 0 and B 1 , are 0000 Á Á Á 00 and 0000 Á Á Á 01 respectively. Each hash function generates a hash value Z i for B i ; and we test randomness of full bits of Z i and sometimes the first 32 bits and the last 32 bits of Z i . We compare our results with SHA512 taken from NIST's suite sts-1.8 and Whirlpool whose hash value is 512 bits [1] . Before stating results of tests we give here the distribution ofÈ È (Fig. 6 ).
The slope in Fig. 5 is gentle compared to Fig. 3 because the size of shift of mantissa is two inÈ È Y .
Results of the NIST statistical test suite
We applied all 188 tests of 15 kinds except FFT test (it is indicated in sts-2.0b that disregard the result of FFT test) to full, high 32 and low 32 bits of SSIhash values Z i respectively. All the parameters of tests were default values except block length = 20000 in the block frequency test. The data for test was a file consisting of 1024 2 Â 1000 bits taken from Z i , i ¼ 0; 1; . . ., which supplies 1000 streams of 1000000 bits to the test. A result of each test is given by a p-value and a proportion of 1000 streams which passed the test at the level of 0.01. It is expected that a p-value spreads uniformly in ½0; 1 and is not extremely close to 0 or 1. To remove exceptional values in the test we repeated NIST's suit 16 times and averaged the p-values and the proportions for each test. Finally we take the maximum and minimum over 187 averages to describe the results shortly. In Tables 2 and 3 we give the result about p-values. As can be seen we have no particular values concerning the results of NIST's test suite.
Results of TestU01
TestU01 contains three suites of statistical tests called SmallCrush, Crash and BigCrush. Because hash functions do not generate hash values so fast as pseudorandom number generators, we adopted Crash suite. The Crash consists of 
Speed of generating hash values
The time of generating a hash value for long input stream of bytes Table 4 , where (B 1 B 2 Á Á Á B 2 20 ) with B i ¼ 0 is a block on memory and is used 1000 times repeatedly (2 20 % 10 6 ). (All times in the tables of this subsection are averages of three trials.) The environment was CPU: Pentium 4, 2.8 GHz, OS: Windows XP x64, compiler: icl.
The SHA512
Ã in the table is a different code of SHA512 given in [11] which fits 64-bit environment. In Table 5 we give the time of generating 10 7 hash values for input streams of bytes fB i g i¼0;1;...10 7 À1 which were defined at the top of this section (recall that each B i consists of 8 bytes).
From these results we can see that SSIhash is good at hashing of long messages. If a message is short, SSIhash operates as if it is a long-digit pseudorandom number generator and most of the time is consumed in the scrambling which contains sixteen multiplications and shifts of multiple-precision integers.
Remark. We constructed and tested SSIhash in 64-bit environment. In 64-bit environment the speed of generating hash values is 3 to 4 times faster than 32-bit environment. So a forthcoming 128 or 256-bit environment will improve the efficiency of SSIhash, especially (viii)-(x) of the scrambling.
Properties of SSR32hash as a Secure Hash Function
In this section we argue the security of SSR32hash, that is, we argue when two different input streams of bytes B and B B for SSR32hash may yield the same hash values. The reason why we consider SSR32hash here is that SSR32hash is the base of SSIhash and the security of SSIhash is argued in the same way. Since in the §6.2 the analysis of SSR32hash is proceeded with a help of calculus, in the following we first assume that the size of mantissa of floating point numbers is finite ( §6.1) and then we assume the size of mantissa is infinite ( §6.2). We further assume that if the size of mantissa is finite, every computation which appears in the steps (i)-(x) of the SSR32hash algorithm is performed accurately and then rounded to finite bits by cutting off the remainder. [Hereafter step (s) stands for the step (s) of the SSR32hash algorithm.] 
Elementary consideration
In order to illustrate the problems clearly, in this subsection, we use the decimal number system where each number is consisting of 6 digits such as 1: Now assume the size of shift of mantissa after a multiplication is one digit such as 1: Moreover the reason why we set the LSB of F and X to be 1 in the SSInhash is based on this consideration.
Security based on algebraic equation of high degree
Hereafter we proceed our argument with a help of calculus, and so in the following we assume that the size of mantissa of floating point numbers is infinite. where buc is the largest integer not exceeding u. Hence steps (i)-(v) which generate W k from W kÀ1 are represented as follows:
where
Then the step (vi) for an input stream B ¼ B 1 Á Á Á B N is expressed as
We remark that if we replace the symbol È with the usual + and remove the symbol <> in the r.h.s of (6.3), it becomes
This polynomial reveals an embedded structure of the step (vi), and is the base of our analysis. Given a multiple-byte integer where AE means + or À. Since 
. . . ; N; and so we know from (6.4) that W N is of the form 3 XÞ NÀkþ1 Á k . Therefore if N À k is large, a change of byte variable B k embedded in 0:0 Á Á Á 0B k 00 Á Á Á always causes a big variation of W N , which makes difficult to control the value W N accurately through B 0 k . On the other hand if N À h is not large, a variation of B h embedded in 0:0 Á Á Á 0B h 00 Á Á Á is insufficient to cover a big change caused by B k with large N À k. This implies that it is very difficult to find a B which yields an aimed W N in the step (vi).
The third thing we can see from (6.5 
. . . are different except for an accidental collision, which leads to W N 6 ¼Ŵ WN N , a contradiction. Therefore B K should be equal toB B K , and consequently N ¼N N and further B should be equal toB B. This is another representation of the assertion given just after (6.5) which says it is very difficult to find different B andB B having finite length and satisfying W N ¼Ŵ WN N in the step (vi).
Next let us consider the steps (viii)-(x) of the scrambling. We also assume the size of mantissa is infinite. ðŶ YÞ in the step (ix) which yields the same hash value as Z 26 in the step (x), one possible way is to solve the equation (6.9) theoretically. However it is well-known that there are no general algorithms which solve an algebraic equation whose degree is higher than 4, and so we give it up. Another way we can choose is to find a solutionŶ Y satisfyingẐ Z 26 ¼È È Y ðŶ YÞ by Brute force, it is very difficult, as we have seen in the consideration just after (6.6), to find an input streamB B of bytes which generatesŶ Y ð¼W W N Þ in the step (vii). Thus we can say that the security of the steps (viii)-(x) of the scrambling is very high.
In a real computer system the size of mantissa is finite. Hence every result of multiplication is rounded to the size of mantissa when it is stored in memories, and at that time a rounding error occurs. So strictly speaking, we should include a consideration in our argument above about the effect of such rounding error. However we did not enter this kind of consideration because the effect of such rounding error works into a direction where the security of SSR32hash is increasing due to uncertainty of rounding error, and because our argument is available and sufficient even considering the effect of such rounding error.
Remark. From (6.6) we know that if a variation from ðB 
e k þe kþ1 þÁÁÁþe N X NÀkþ1 Á k , which is a linear combination of Á k . If one feels to be anxious about such simple structure of X in the linear combination, we recommend to use X k = X È (b 21 Á Á Á b 28 of the mantissa of W kÀ1 ) instead of X in the step (iii). This modification also increases the security of SSRhash.
Conclusion
(1) We constructed a new algorithm of hash functions called SSIhash. The algorithm is, differently from many other hash functions, consisting of multiplication and shift of multiple-precision integers. The algorithm is flexible and can treat any size of hash values not only to n bits treated here. (2) As the first stage of examining properties of SSIhash, we tested randomness of hash values generated by SSIhash, and had good results. (3) As the second stage, we examined the security of our hash function and showed that it is very difficult to find different input streams of bytes whose hash values are the same.
